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Abstract In Moohan v Lord Advocate  the United Kingdom Supreme Court has, 
in the context of a case challenging the exclusion of convicted prisoners from 
voting in the Scottish Independence Referendum, confirmed the orthodox view 
that Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
does not guarantee rights of participation beyond voting for membership of an 
established legislature and, specifically, does not extend to voting in 
referendums. Two strong dissents in the case recognise the democratic 
weakness of this position and argue that the Strasbourg position is not as 
absolute as it may seem and that article 3 can properly be interpreted to 
include referendums in its scope, particularly those which relate to the right of 
self-determination. 
 
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees strong rights to 
political expression and to association and peaceful assembly for political 
purposes. But beyond these, rights of political participation are relatively thin. 
Article 3 of the First Protocol (article 3) is the “Right to free elections”. “The 
High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free 
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”.  
 
On its face article 3 expresses only a duty on states to hold elections under 
certain conditions. However, the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg 
Court) has inferred from this duty a requirement that states guarantee 
individual rights to vote, to stand in an elections for the legislature1 and, if 
elected, to take one’s seat2. These individual rights are not absolute and may 
be limited by the states in ways over which they have a considerable margin of 
appreciation. However, limitations are subject to the reviewing power of the 
Strasbourg Court on the basis that they should not deprive the rights of their 
essence and should not thwart the will of the people3. The Court recognises 
that only a “democratic” system can properly guarantee human rights. 
However, the different constitutional structures and traditions of the state 
parties made it, at the time of drafting, and continue to make it today, very 
difficult for anything but the most abstract conception of democratic 
procedures and institutions to be Convention requirements4. There is, for 
example, no need for a directly or fully elected executive; nor need the 
legislature be fully elected and there is no requirement that the legislature 
reflect in a proportional way the will of the people5. Broader rights to 
participation are not found and a contrast can be drawn with article 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which refers to a 
right, directly or through representatives, to “take part in the conduct of public 
affairs” and includes a right of “access, on general terms of equality, to public 
service…”.  
 
Moohan v Lord Advocate6 (Moohan) explores this relatively narrow view of 
rights to political participation.  The decision upholds, in domestic law, the 
consistent position of the Strasbourg Court that the individual rights to vote, to 
stand and to sit in the chamber if elected, apply only to elections to the 
“legislature” and not to referendums (nor local government elections or other 
forms of seeking the views of the populace). However the decision is subject to 
dissenting judgments that point up the relative poverty of participation rights 
and, perhaps, indicate future developments. 
 
The case involved a challenge brought by serving prisoners who were denied 
the right to vote in the Scottish Independence Referendum (Referendum) held 
on 18 September 2014. The legal basis for the ban was section 3(1) the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 which was applicable to the 
Referendum by virtue of section 2 of the Scottish Independence Referendum 
(Franchise) Act 20137 - though it should be noted that convicted prisoners 
were also directly excluded from the Referendum franchise under section 3 of 
the 2013 Act8.  
 
In R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice9 the Supreme Court had accepted 
that, as a matter of domestic law under the Human Rights Act, the guarantee 
in article 3 includes the right of at least some, otherwise qualified, convicted 
prisoners to vote in General and European elections10. The question in Moohan  
was whether this should extend to voting in the Scottish Independence 
Referendum. 
 The consistent rulings of the Strasbourg Court 
The majority applied the clear and consistent case law of the Strasbourg Court 
to the effect that the right to vote inherent in article 3 is confined to elections 
for the legislature. The legislature has not been defined in abstracto. The 
principle of “effective democracy” means that it can only be identified in the 
context of a state’s developing constitutional arrangements11. It includes those 
institutions which, singularly or as a complex whole, have a decisive role in the 
enactment of primary legislation applying in a country. It is not confined to a 
single, sovereign, national assembly but can include, for example, devolved or 
regional assemblies; for EU states it includes the European Parliament, treated 
sui generis12. The legislature is concerned with primary legislation and so 
excludes bodies that are wholly executive13 or local councils whose law-making 
powers are delegated and exercised under the authority and limitations of 
primary legislation14. Likewise institutions or procedure that do not have a 
decisive role in the legislative process but whose function is merely advisory or 
deliberative are likely to be excluded15. 
 
The Strasbourg Court’s case law has so far been consistent in excluding 
referendums from the ambit of article 3. For example the referendum over 
UK’s continued membership of the EU in 1975 was of a “purely consultative” 
character16. The Strasbourg case law relates to admissibility decisions and 
contains no or little discussion. Previous authority is cited to justify a straight 
forward assertion that article 3 is limited to the “choice of the legislature” and 
therefore does not “apply to... referendums” 17. The exclusion of referendums 
from article 3 was followed, axiomatically, in respect of a referendum 
approving membership of the EU18. There is brief discussion in McLean v 
United Kingdom19 where prisoners in Scotland complained their article 3 right 
to vote had been breached. Although inadmissible for other reasons, the 
Strasbourg Court held that article 3 clearly applied to the General Election and 
to elections for the Scottish and European Parliaments; but not to local 
elections. In respect of the United Kingdom’s Alternative Vote referendum, 
2011, the Court endorsed its earlier case law and, subject to an implied 
proviso, discussed below, held that article 3 was not violated. 
 
The majority in Moohan accepted, for domestic law, that there was no reason, 
based on fundamental principles of common law, to depart from this clear and 
consistent line of authority coming from the Strasbourg Court. Section 2 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 does not warrant UK law to provide a more “generous” 
outcome than would be available in Strasbourg unless it “flows naturally” (and 
is not clearly at odds with) the Strasbourg jurisprudence20. The case law is 
unequivocal and does not support a possible “direction of travel” towards 
applying article 3 even to some types of referendum. 
 
The dissenting judgments 
Moohan contains two strong dissents by Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson. These 
dissents have at their centre a sense that the majority’s conventional, narrow, 
reading of article 3 is an arbitrary limit on the support for effective democracy 
and political participation that human rights should provide. Some form of 
democracy is the only system in which human rights can be effectively 
guaranteed and so article 3 should be given a purposive interpretation – it 
should promote, not restrict, the right of people to participate (at least 
indirectly) in the processes through which they are governed. Whether or not 
Scotland was to be an independent country was one of the most important 
political questions of the age and it was, on the face of it, a “bizarre anomaly”21 
for the right to vote in article 3 not to be effective22. In Lord Kerr’s view the 
Preamble to the Convention “envisages the guarantee of an ‘effective political 
democracy’ as the foundation of all other rights enjoyed by those within its 
protection…it is difficult to see how that purpose would be other than 
frustrated by preventing the safeguards applicable to ordinary legislative 
elections from applying to this most fundamental of votes”23. 
 
The decisiveness of the Strasbourg case law. 
For the minority it was not so obvious that there was a clear and consistent 
line of reasoning coming from the Strasbourg Court. Few, if any, of the cases 
contain any argument and the focus of article 3 on the legislature is asserted 
axiomatically with little if any consideration of the purpose of the article in the 
context of effective democracy. An additional sentence in McLean v United 
Kingdom, suggested, to the minority, that the Strasbourg approach may not be 
as absolute and axiomatic as thought. The Strasbourg Court reiterated the 
conventional position but then added that “(T)here is nothing in the nature of 
the referendum in issue in the present case that would lead the Court to reach 
a different conclusion here”24. This implies that the nature or purpose of the 
referendum might be relevant and that referendums bound up with the 
“choice of the legislature” might be within the scope of article 3. There has not 
been a referendum dealing with secession that has been considered by the 
Court. 
 The nature of the referendum: and the wording of article 3 
In the view of the minority there were at least two reasons why the Scottish 
Independence Referendum was of an altogether different quality. 
First, if article 3 is read properly, with regard to its purpose25 the Referendum 
could and should be brought within its scope. It was a vote relating to the 
“choice of the legislature” – the choice of which legislature should make the 
laws for the people in Scotland. In that sense it could be distinguished from, for 
example, referendums on voting systems or membership of the European 
Union.  
 
This position was directly opposed by the majority. The Strasbourg Court has 
not applied article 3 to referendums on membership of the European Union 
yet they involve voting to accept the authority of a different, more complex, 
legislature and, therefore, are not very different from an independence 
referendum.  The majority agreed with a concurring judgment, written by Lord 
Neuberger, which considered the language of article 3. The use of the definite 
article before “legislature” suggests a “specific and established” entity and so 
the “choice” relates to its membership rather than the possible adoption of a 
new legislature. For the majority, other aspects of the linguistic analysis of 
article 3 undermined the idea that it should apply to referendums generally. 
“Elections”, which appears in article 3, does not imply a referendum since the 
latter does not involve anyone being elected. Secondly, article 3 expressly 
imposes a duty on states to hold elections “at reasonable intervals” and there 
is no duty under the Convention ever to hold a referendum, let alone at regular 
intervals. 
 
The nature of the referendum: binding or advisory? 
The second reason why the minority took the view that the Scottish 
Independence Referendum might be sufficiently different in nature from those 
that had heretofore come before the Strasbourg Commission or Court was that 
it had binding effect; it could not be understood as being merely consultative 
or advisory. X v UK26 is an early Commission case with one sentence giving 
reasons for the exclusion of referendums from article 3. These were, firstly, 
that there was no legal obligation to hold the referendum in issue and, 
secondly, it was merely consultative. The Scottish Independence Referendum 
was different: “both the United Kingdom and Scottish governments had agreed 
that the result of the referendum would be binding and section 1(1) of the 
Scottish Independence Referendum Act imposed the legal obligation to 
organise the referendum”27.   
 
Here, again, the majority took a different view; one that engages with an 
important constitutional uncertainty. In conceptually distinguishing elections 
from referendums Lord Neuberger argued that an election directly brings 
about a particular outcome – the election of an MP. A referendum, on the 
other hand, is only indirectly related to an outcome. It does not directly change 
the law but requires further legislative steps to be taken – “a ‘yes’ vote would 
not have directly triggered independence for Scotland”28. Although the political 
parties had committed themselves, on a “yes” majority, to granting 
independence, MPs retain their constitutional duty to vote on the basis of their 
judgement29 and that judgement would be exercised in relation to an 
independence bill written after extensive post-referendum negotiations. In this 
sense all referendums, particularly given the UK’s constitutional arrangements, 
are advisory or consultative and, in the view of the majority, that is how 
Strasbourg has conceived them.  
 
Lord Wilson, for the minority, thought it “far-fetched” to deny the political 
reality – that a “yes” vote would bring about the legislative changes necessary 
for independence. This “binding” character of the Scottish Independence 
Referendum distinguished it from others and made it all the more compelling 
that human rights, whose purpose was to protect democratic participation, 
should protect the right to vote in it. 
 
There was little discussion of this important constitutional issue. It is submitted 
that it is not obvious that the courts should accept, as a legal principle 
informing any decisions they are called to make, the idea that any referendum 
is binding. It was not clear that a (specifically) narrow victory for the Yes 
Campaign would have created a clear constitutional duty on MPs to vote for 
the statutory changes required for independence. The Edinburgh Agreement 
was that the referendum would “deliver a fair test and a decisive expression of 
the views of people in Scotland and a result that everyone will respect” 30. This 
was an agreement made, from the UK side, under the Royal Prerogative. 
Parliament was not directly involved in the Referendum process nor 
committed in advance to any understanding of the result. It is not obvious that 
“respect” for a narrow, and arguably indecisive, “yes” vote would have, 
necessarily and without doubt, placed a duty on MPs to vote for independence 
legislation. The extent to which the Scottish Referendum was binding on 
Parliament was a matter of disagreement in the Supreme Court in Moohan and 
may be an issue of considerable constitutional significance if there is another 
referendum on Scottish independence. 
 
ICCPR 
The Supreme Court also considered, and divided over, the effect of article 25 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 25 
includes a right to “participation in public life” and, therefore, is not limited to 
elections to the legislature. Indeed, in Gillot v France31 the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee expressly applied article 25 to secession 
referendums and, in its General Comment on article 25, includes, in the idea of 
“participation”, voting in referendums which involve the choosing or changing 
of the constitution or the deciding of public issues32. The issue was whether 
article 25 ICCPR could have a decisively persuasive impact on interpreting the 
scope of article 3. 
 
In Moohan the majority held that article 25 ICCPR, because of its different 
wording, would be unlikely to assist in interpretation of article 3. Furthermore, 
following the Strasbourg Court, any influence article 25 ICCPR might have on 
the interpretation article 3 would not displace the focus of article 3 on 
elections for the legislature. In Yevdokimov and Rezanov v Russian Federation 
201133 the UN HR Committee held that the denial of the vote of prisoners in 
the Russian Presidential elections violated article 25. In Anchugov v Russia34 
the Strasbourg Court, with Yevdokimov before it, had found no such breach of 
article 3 in respect of the same, Presidential, elections. 
 
The majority in Moohan upheld the orthodox, “dualist” position that rights in 
the ICCPR have not been given effect in UK domestic law and so, as an 
unincorporated treaty, it does not limit the competence of the Scottish 
Parliament.  
 
Lord Kerr, in the minority, accepted that the position of the Strasbourg Court in 
Anchugov meant that the persuasive application of article 25 ICCPR to the 
interpretation of article 3 was “problematical”. He argued, instead, by 
reference to the special quality of the Scottish Independence Referendum – 
that it concerned the right of the Scottish people to self-determination. This is 
a right found not only in article 1 ICCPR but is also accepted as jus cogens; and 
so is capable of influencing, even invalidating, any contrary rules of 
international law35. In Lord Kerr’s view “it is clearly arguable that the 
protections guaranteed by article 25 ICCPR ought to apply to any vote taken in 
the exercise of the article 1 right to self-determination”36. Other provisions of 
international (or domestic) law should not be allowed to restrict this 
protection. Confining article 3 to votes for the legislature involves such a 
restriction. To avoid this article 3 can, properly, be interpreted to give effect to 
article 25 ICCPR, at least in respect of votes involving the right to self-
determination37. 
The common law 
The claimants in Moohan also argued that the ban on Prisoners voting in the 
referendum violated a common law right to vote. It was accepted that, whilst 
the common law might well recognise voting as a fundamental right, it could 
not be asserted against the clear expression of the will of Parliament. The 
courts should not have a direct role in approving the franchise (i.e. by having 
the last word on the proportionality of general statutory restrictions on 
voting). The franchise has always been a matter decided under the Royal 
Prerogative or, now entirely, by Parliament. It is noteworthy that the majority 
did accept that serious abuse by Parliament might, perhaps, justify a court 
declaring a statute invalid. If there is a “new constitutional hypothesis” based 
on the idea of a “common law constitution” then protection of democracy 
from, for example, an attempt by a Parliamentary majority to entrench its 
position by alteration to the franchise, might join attempts at wide scale 
abolition of judicial review, as reasons for the court to invalidate a statute38. 
EU law 
Finally it was argued by the claimants that the ban of prisoners voting violated 
EU law. This was rejected unanimously on the grounds that there is no free 
standing right to vote in EU law. Expressions of the right to vote (such as in 
Chapter V of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) do not expressly apply to 
referendums and do not grant rights that go beyond the rights of nationals39. 
The franchise is a matter of national law which is subject to review under the 
European Convention and the Strasbourg Court40. 
Conclusion 
If not an anomaly, the scope of article 3 seems limited and unable to secure 
full rights of both direct and indirect participation in public affairs as are, for 
example, guaranteed by article 25 ICCPR. The limited nature of article 3 may be 
explained, as Lord Kerr suggests, by the reluctance of signatory states to allow 
non-elected parts of their constitutions to be open to human rights challenges. 
Nevertheless, there is, today, widespread concern at low level of political 
interest and participation. Solutions found within the United Kingdom include 
opening up some executive or administrative offices to direct election (e.g. 
directly elected mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners), making local 
councils more effective and attractive by widening their powers (e.g. 
introducing a general power of competence under the Localism Act 2011) and 
by the use of a range of polls and referendums both to decide important local 
questions41 but also national questions of supreme importance such as Scottish 
independence and membership of the EU. In this context, and leaving aside the 
rights and wrongs of prisoner voting, it might be useful to ensure that only 
lawful, reasonable and proportionate rules can inhibit the right to vote. The 
minority opinions in Moohan perhaps point a way forward for both the 
Strasbourg Court and UK law. 
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